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A B S T R A C T   
The decarbonisation of heating represents a transformative challenge for many countries. The UK’s net-zero 
greenhouse gas emissions target requires the removal of fossil fuel combustion from heating in just three de-
cades. A greater understanding of policy processes linked to system transformations is expected to be of value for 
understanding systemic change; how policy makers perceive policy issues can impact on policy change with 
knock-on effects for energy system change. This article builds on the literature considering policy maker per-
ceptions and focuses on the issue of UK heat policy. Using qualitative analysis, we show that policy makers 
perceive heat decarbonisation as disruptive, technological pathways are seen as deeply uncertain and heat 
decarbonisation appears to offer policy makers little ‘up-side’. Perceptions are bounded by uncertainty, affected 
by concerns over negative impacts, influenced by external influences and relate to ideas of continuity. Further 
research and evidence on optimal heat decarbonisation and an adaptive approach to governance could support 
policy makers to deliver policy commensurate with heat decarbonisation. However even with reduced uncer-
tainty and more flexible governance, the perceptions of disruption to consumers mean that transformative heat 
policy may remain unpopular for policy makers, potentially putting greenhouse mitigation targets at risk of being 
missed.   
1. Introduction 
Decarbonising heat is a pressing global climate change mitigation 
issue and the scale of the required low carbon heat transformation 
means that ‘careful planning and policy are required’ (Nature Energy, 
2016, p1). Heat currently represents around half of global energy use 
(IEA, 2014) and is responsible for around 40% of global energy-related 
carbon dioxide emissions (IEA, 2017). While modelling has suggested 
that residential heating can be decarbonised at a rate commensurate 
with the 1.5 �C target in the Paris agreement, this will require ‘substan-
tial’ policy efforts and ‘stringent’ policy instruments (Knobloch et al., 
2019, p521 and p541). 
However, the development of policy is normally messy and unpre-
dictable (Cairney, 2016) and policy to drive a heat transformation may 
not necessarily be objective and based on the best available evidence. 
Heating requires a rapid transformation where fossil fuel combustion 
is replaced by low carbon alternatives (IEA, 2013). Transitions of large 
systems such as energy systems are ‘inherently political1’ (Meadowcroft, 
2011, p71) and the heat transformation may challenge and need to 
overcome existing interests (Geels, 2014). 
The UK debate around the optimum pathway for decarbonisation of 
heat, let alone the required policy to deliver it, already appears messy 
and affected by interests. Heat related incumbents2 are already pro-
moting decarbonisation approaches which maintain a gas based system 
in spite of other technological approaches (which may, but not neces-
sarily, be better) (Lowes et al., 2018a). 
UK Government literature which previously highlighted a need for 
mass electrification of heating for decarbonisation now considers two 
Abbreviations: CCC, Committee on Climate Change; CCS, Carbon capture and storage; ZCH, Zero carbon homes. 
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competing approaches, electrification of much heat demand or con-
verting the UK gas system for heat to run on low carbon hydrogen (HM 
Government, 2017). The UK heat outlook is deeply uncertain and 
progress towards decarbonisation is limited. 
In order to develop understandings of transformative heat policy and 
build on previous analysis of policy makers’ perceptions, this article 
investigates the perceptions of UK policy makers involved with heat 
decarbonisation towards options for heat decarbonisation. Basing our 
analysis on semi-structured, expert interviews, we push the policy maker 
perceptions literature forward by utilising ideas from the literature on 
the psychology of by policy making. 
1.1. Context and research focus 
The lack of progress on heat decarbonisation and the current un-
certainty around heat decarbonisation is a key UK energy policy issue. 
This article investigates the following research questions:  
1. How do policy makers perceive options for heat decarbonisation?  
2. Can these perceptions be linked to existing theory on the psychology 
of policy makers?  
3. Do the findings from this research have any implications for the UK 
and wider international heat decarbonisation policy? 
The paper is structured as follows:  
� Section 2 considers the status of UK heat decarbonisation policy;  
� Section 3 reviews relevant literature associated with transitions and 
policy maker perceptions and psychology;  
� Section 4 describes the research methodology;  
� Section 5 discusses findings from the research;  
� Section 6 considers specific UK conclusions and policy implications 
and also considers wider international policy implications. 
2. The UK’s heat juncture 
Fossil fuels currently dominate heat consumption in the UK, with 
84% of homes using fossil gas for heating (Xoserve, 2018) and oil and 
solid fuels providing around 10% of overall non-industrial heat use 
(BEIS, 2018a). 
Under the 80%3 greenhouse gas reduction target introduced in 2008 
Climate Change Act (Parliament, 2008), near total UK heat decarbon-
isation was seen to be required in order to allow residual emissions in 
other sectors which were seen as more difficult/expensive to decar-
bonise (Committee on Climate Change, 2016). 
The UK’s recently introduced net-zero goal for 2050 (Parliament, 
2019) implies more rapid and total heat decarbonisation. Statutory 
government advisor ‘The Committee on Climate Change’ (CCC) suggests 
that to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, no fossil fuel heat systems can 
be installed after 2035 (Committee on Climate Change, 2019a). Despite 
the long term goal for heat decarbonisation, how to reach it appears 
uncertain and progress is limited. 
While mass electrification of heat has been assumed to be a 
requirement of heat decarbonisation4 (Chaudry et al., 2015; DECC, 
2013; UKERC, 2009), the potential technology options for heat decar-
bonisation have become more diverse and pathways include roles for 
heat pumps (and electrification in general), district heating, bio-energy, 
hydrogen and varying levels of increased energy efficiency (Lowes et al., 
2018b; Winskel, 2016) highlighting significant uncertainty. 
The UK’s progress towards decarbonised heat has also been 
extremely limited with number of energy efficiency installations 
significantly falling in 2013 and not increasing,5 low levels of heat pump 
and heat network deployment and the majority of new homes being 
connected to the gas grid (Committee on Climate Change, 2016; UKERC, 
2018). The key policy instrument to deliver low carbon heat, the 
Renewable Heat Incentive, which opened in 2011 (Connor et al., 2015), 
has not supported the deployment of low-carbon heat at the expected 
rate (National Audit Office, 2018). 
2.1. The emergence of a potential role for hydrogen and heating 
hybridisation 
Uncertainty around heat decarbonisation appears to have increased. 
Recently, and potentially partly as a result of the efforts by incumbents 
to protect their own interests through political influencing, UK policy 
makers have been paying increased attention to the idea of converting 
the UK’s existing gas grid to run on low carbon hydrogen as a means to 
decarbonise heating as opposed to an electrification based approach 
(Lowes et al., 2018a). 
The 2017 ‘Clean Growth Strategy’ white paper contained three 
pathways, one which included 76% of domestic heat in 2050 being 
provided using electricity with 0% hydrogen for heat, one where elec-
tricity provided 60% of domestic heat and 0% hydrogen (alongside 
emissions removal technologies) and one where hydrogen provided 62% 
of domestic heat and electricity 14% (HM Government, 2017, p151). 
The variance between these pathways highlights clear uncertainty for 
policy makers who have suggested that heat is the Government’s ‘most 
difficult policy and technology challenge to meet our carbon targets’ (HM 
Government, 2017, p76). 
Further complexity has been added by the potential for ‘hybrid’ 
systems which combine a heat pump and a gas boiler, possibly using 
hydrogen, which are potentially more suitable for buildings with lower 
thermal efficiency and can reduce system impacts and costs of full heat 
electrification (Strbac et al., 2018). Strbac et al.’s (2018) analysis fed 
into the Committee on Climate Change’s analysis considering technol-
ogy mixes for reducing emissions to ‘net-zero’ levels with the CCC 
suggesting a significant increase in both district heating and heat pumps 
providing the majority of heat in most homes but with hydrogen 
potentially providing an important back-up role (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019a, 2019b). It should however be noted that the CCC, in 
their previous hydrogen review, ‘do not recommend that a full hydrogen 
pathway be pursued’ for reasons of technical feasibility, and potential 
challenges around import dependency and insufficient emission re-
ductions (Committee on Climate Change, 2018, p94). 
Choosing whether to electrify, hybridise or convert to hydrogen, 
heating represents a clear challenge for policy makers who are aiming to 
develop a policy framework for heat by mid-2020 (BEIS, 2018b). 
3. Literature review: sustainability transitions and the role of 
policy makers 
A significant research focus on the transitions of large socio-technical 
systems from being unsustainable to less unsustainable has developed 
over the past two decades and continues to expand rapidly (K€ohler et al., 
2019). However, transitions approaches have been accused of being 
undermined by not paying due attention to the importance of power, 
including more specifically the attempts by and ability of actors to drive 
systemic transformations in alignment with self-interests (e.g. Avelino 
and Wittmayer, 2016; Hendriks, 2009; Meadowcroft, 2011; Shove and 
Walker, 2007, 2010; Smith et al., 2005). 
The development of public policy associated with transitions is rec-
ognised as being one specific power related ‘black-box’ issue which 
needs ‘opening up’ in order to further enhance understandings of ideas of 
3 Compared to 1990 levels.  
4 Often with heat pumps and alongside significant reductions in heat demand, 
growth in heat networks. 
5 Significant energy efficiency deployment has been achieved before 2013. 
See Committee on Climate Change, p96 (2018b). 
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power in transitions (Smith et al., 2010, p446). Scholars have increas-
ingly considered the importance of public policy associated with tran-
sitions (Kern et al., 2014; Kuzemko et al., 2016; Lockwood et al., 2017; 
Lowes et al., 2019; Wesseling et al., 2015). 
This article contributes to the literature on policy associated with 
systemic transitions by focusing on the policy process associated with 
the UK’s potential transformation to low-carbon heating. It provides 
novelty for analysis considering policy associated with transitions 
through its focus on the roles and perceptions of policy makers. 
The following two sub-sections consider firstly, how policy makers, i. 
e. the individuals involved in policy development, in particular those 
working in or for Government,6 can be understood as a part of the policy 
process and secondly how the perceptions of policy makers may affect 
policy change and have been investigated before. 
3.1. Policy makers and the policy process 
While multiple models and approaches to understand the policy 
process exist, individuals are central to the process (Sabatier and Weible, 
2014). Cairney and Heikkila (2014) explain: ‘People making choices are at 
the heart of policy studies, but not all theories conceptualise this process 
extensively’ (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014, p364). Reviewing eight policy 
analysis frameworks, Cairney and Heikkila (2014, p367) highlight the 
various and often opposing ways policy makers are viewed with, 
depending on the framework, policy makers seen as:  
� Comprehensively rational and able to make perfectly rational 
decisions;  
� Acting based on rational choice, i.e. maximising personal utility;  
� Ambiguous and inexact;  
� Affected by ‘bounded rationality’ which implies the impossibility of 
perfectly rational decisions in light of incomplete evidence and can 
lead to satisficing i.e. finding satisfactory outcomes;  
� Affected by values, emotions and heuristics;  
� Affected by existing institutions;  
� Affected by existing beliefs and prone to ‘devil shift’.7 
Overall, there is little (if any) agreement across policy approaches to 
understand the role of individuals with some quite opposing views 
taken, particularly around ideas of rationality (or a lack of it). It is 
however clear that policy makers are understood to be affected by a 
range of issues including beliefs, values and institutions. 
Despite the importance of the role of policy makers on policy change, 
the specific literature considering the psychology of the policy process is 
very limited and ‘We are still scratching at the surface of the links between 
psychology and policy making’ (Cairney, 2019a). In combining general 
insights from psychology and policy studies, Cairney and Kwiatkowski 
(2017) suggest that as well as being affected by ‘bounded rationality’ 
(p2), the policy making process is affected by the emotions of and 
cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) taken by policy makers (highlighting the 
work of Lewis (2013)). 
3.2. Policy makers and their perceptions 
While the specific theory on the psychology and policy change may 
be limited, an existing, but separate, literature considers the 
‘perceptions’ of policy makers, focusing on perceptions as beliefs. 
The policy maker perceptions literature can be considered as 
descriptive, rather than explanatory, focusing on what the perceptions 
of policy makers are, with little consideration of the policy impact of 
these perceptions. Key relevant literature is now reviewed briefly. 
The lens of policy maker perceptions appears to have been most 
applied to health policy research. Corrigan and Watson (2003) suggest 
that because of the importance of information in shaping policy makers 
views, those attempting to influence policy makers working on the 
distribution of resources for mental health services should provide 
useful data on which supportive policy decisions can be made. Striking a 
similar conclusion on the role of information, Morrison et al. (2015) 
investigated ‘perceptions and beliefs’ of policy makers in Barcelona with 
regards to health inequality issues. They suggested that their results 
showed more information (particularly from researchers) could support 
policy makers who, based on their analysis, do not believe they have 
enough information to make affective policy on health inequality. 
Taking a different approach, Haghdoost et al. (2017) made policy 
recommendations directly based on Iranian policy makers’ perceptions 
on what would enhance fertility; this approach however lacked a clear 
theoretical justification. 
Nuclear energy is another issue where policy maker perceptions have 
been considered. Thomas et al. (1980) showed that policy makers’ 
perceptions of the public’s view on nuclear energy accurately reflected 
the publics actual beliefs; the authors suggested that how this translated 
into policy making was of interest from a policy development perspec-
tive but didn’t investigate this further. 
More recently, Li et al. (2018) investigated how policy makers 
perceive the role of science in driving nuclear energy policy and sug-
gested that policy makers, supportive advocacy groups and industry 
stakeholders saw science as less important for nuclear policy develop-
ment than non-profit groups (such as think tanks). Li et al. (2018) went 
on to suggest that their analysis had filled a gap in the literature by 
showing how ‘issue concern’, i.e. the importance of the most salient 
issues for policy makers (p778) had affected nuclear energy perceptions. 
3.3. Section summary 
The policy process is seen to be an important element of transitions 
to sustainability. The psychology of policy makers, including their per-
ceptions, forms an important element of policy processes yet the liter-
ature on the specific effects of psychological issues on policy change is 
limited. 
Focusing on the UK’s potential transformation to sustainable heat-
ing, this article considers the perceptions of policy makers associated 
with heat decarbonisation policy. This article provides novelty through 
focusing on the live policy issue of heat decarbonisation in the UK. 
4. Methodology 
The previously identified existing literature considering policy 
maker perceptions has used interviews or questionnaires for data 
collection. For this analysis a ‘large N study’ was not suitable because of 
the relatively small number of policy maker experts working on UK heat 
decarbonisation and because of the exploratory nature of the research. 
The overall methodological approach closely follows that of Morrison 
et al. (2015) who investigated the perceptions of heath policy makers in 
Barcelona. 
4.1. Data collection 
Ten in depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out with pol-
icy network actors with expertise in UK heat policy issues during 
December 2018 and January 2019. While the majority of interviewees 
6 The term ‘policy-maker’ is not well defined in the policy literature. Cairney 
(2019b) expands on the issue and, considering ‘policy makers’ and ‘influencers’ 
together, suggests these actors can operate across policy networks and co-
alitions and work to unwritten rules and beliefs.  
7 ‘Devil shift’ can be considered as a form of distorted perception where a 
certain advocacy coalition over-estimates an opposing coalition’s ‘evilness’ and 
level of influence while underestimating their own power (Vogeler and Ban-
delow, 2018, p718). 
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worked or previously worked in Government or politics on heat issues, 
some non-government actors with relevant heat policy expertise were 
also interviewed. While non-government associated actors do not have 
the legal authority to make policy decisions, they can be an important 
element of policy networks and associated policy formation (Compston, 
2009; Sabatier and Weible, 2014) and their inclusion allowed a larger 
number of interviews and has provided more rounded and open insights. 
The focus of interviews was specifically on the perceptions of policy 
makers. 
The group of interviewees was made up of8:  
� 1 politician (1);  
� 1 political advisor (2);  
� 1 independent government advisor (3);  
� 1 ex-political advisor (4);  
� 2 industry based heat decarbonisation policy experts (5 and 6);  
� 1 non-party-political think tank energy analyst (7);  
� 1 consultant with heat decarbonisation policy experience (8);  
� 2 civil servants (9 and 10). 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen to allow a deep focus on 
particular issues but with scope for a broader discussion (Kvale, 1996). 
Interviews were based around a set of exploratory questions which had 
been tested during pilot interviews. An interview outline is included in 
annex 1. 
Questions were designed to be exploratory and open ended and 
considered the interviewees general view on heat decarbonisation 
technology options (namely conversion of the gas grid to hydrogen and 
heat electrification), how potential options linked to general policy 
goals, the potential for technologies to disrupt or support continuity, 
deliverability of options and the impact of uncertainty on policy making. 
Interviewees were selected based on the research team’s a priori 
knowledge of the UK heat policy network and a snowballing process was 
used where interviewees were asked to identify to provide other po-
tential interviewees. In order to gain personal (rather than corporate/ 
party political) views, interviewees were advised that all interviews 
were completely anonymous9 and were also reminded that this research 
was interested in policy makers’ perceptions. 
4.2. Data analysis 
Interview data was transcribed and then coded using the NVivo 
software package. The interviews were coded to emergent codes and 
also to pre-established codes linked to research questions. Following 
coding, codes were organised into larger themes and these themes and 
the codes they contained formed the basis of results. Where relevant 
grey literature can enhance interview results, this is included in section 
5. Interview transcripts were sent to all interviewees who were given an 
opportunity to comment on transcripts in order to validate results. While 
some clarifications were made to transcripts, these changes had no 
impact on final results. 
5. Results and discussion 
This section describes the results of the policy maker analysis and 
considers the importance of these perceptions for heat decarbonisation 
policy development. The technological options of heat electrification or 
converting the gas grid to hydrogen featured frequently in interviews 
and this apparent binary is reflected in the results. 
Comments or ideas from interviews are referenced with a number in 
brackets and the type of interviewee can be identified by referring to 
section 4.1. Relevant quotes are included to highlight specific issues and 
to provide a more direct connection to underlying data. Relevant grey 
literature is considered in these results if of value. 
The structure of the results section is based on the coding structure 
which reflects both emergent codes and codes based on the pre- 
determined foci, linked to both research and interview questions. 
5.1. Disruption or continuity for policy makers 
The issue of ‘disruption’ emerged as a key issue for policy makers 
involved in heat decarbonisation. Disruption is frequently seen as the 
opposite of continuity; while some change may be constant, disruptive 
change is suggested to be either rapid or high magnitude deviations from 
past trends (Ketsopoulou et al., 2019). Ideas of ‘disruptive innovation’ 
focus more specifically on the challenges of new entrants against in-
cumbents through product innovation (Christensen et al., 2015). 
Reflecting the emergence of varying disruptive issues from our analysis, 
we take a broad view of disruption, viewing it as rapid or large de-
viations from past trends with the expectation of major impacts on 
actors. 
All interviewees saw heat decarbonisation as challenging and 
disruptive whatever technology route may be pursued. Concerns were 
raised over potentially ‘invasive’ (4) disruption to homes where new heat 
systems or energy efficiency measures would be needed (2, 4, 5, 8, 9) 
and potential energy bill increases caused by decarbonisation (5, 8, 9). 
Heat was suggested to have more consumer disruption than electricity or 
transport decarbonisation (5). 
Regarding the options of electrification or hydrogen, one civil ser-
vant explained ‘I think they’re equally bad, equally difficult’ (10) and an 
ex-political advisor went on ‘there’s nothing compelling. There’s just lots of 
problems with both options’ (4). This general negativity towards decar-
bonisation appeared to be ignoring potential positive impacts such as 
meeting decarbonisation targets, reducing energy imports and creating 
more efficient and comfortable buildings, all potential outcomes. 
Interestingly, meeting decarbonisation targets was not mentioned as a 
specific positive by any of the interviewees despite this being a key 
policy outcome. This suggests perhaps that while the UK decarbon-
isation target is set in law, and heat decarbonisation is an explicit policy 
focus, the actual perceived benefit of heat decarbonisation to policy 
makers and its perceived importance is limited. 
According to policy makers, the approach of converting the gas grid 
to hydrogen could provide some continuity because ‘a substantial part of 
the system remains intact’ (1) and the existing gas based skill set could 
support hydrogen (3). 
5.1.1. Disruption for consumers 
Of particular concern to all interviewees was the fear of disruption to 
consumers. The ideas of disruption were associated with anything that 
impacted consumers, varying from required modifications to people’s 
homes to the potential performance of low carbon heating systems 
compared to current systems: 
‘it’s [consumer impacts] definitely a concern’ (10) 
‘people like gas, don’t they? People like to cook on gas and to heat on gas’ 
(9) 
‘There’s never been a moment when any government said, “You have to 
do this thing to your house"’ (2) 
8 The number in brackets is used for reference in the results section.  
9 Relevant ethical considerations were taken including total anonymity for 
interviewees in light of the political nature of the research. Results have also 
been presented so that interviewees are not identifiable. The research project 
was subject to University of Exeter ethical processes and approved (application 
i.d. eCORN000064 v2.1). 
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‘it actually is something that people can feel and will potentially have to 
change their behaviour in their homes. I think that’s quite important from 
a policy perspective’ (5). 
A specific concern raised was that a small number of high profile 
stories about poor performance of low carbon heating systems could 
affect wider public opinions on overall heat decarbonisation. 
‘all it takes is a couple of horror stories or something to go wrong to really 
change public perception quite quickly and certain newspapers publishing 
certain things can (laughs) really shift the dial. So it’s a massive concern 
for us and that’s for all the options’ (10) 
An industry representative explained, ‘if it’s mishandled it risks losing 
widespread support for decarbonisation in general’ (6). An energy consul-
tant continued ‘something needs to be done on both of those technologies 
[electrification or hydrogen] to make sure the consumer experience is going 
to be a good one. Otherwise this will get completely derailed’ (8). 
Unless consumers were supportive of decarbonisation, driving 
‘disruptive’ change with policy would be ‘impossible’ (3). A politician 
agreed that unless consumers saw some benefit, heat decarbonisation 
was unlikely to progress (1). A consultant explained ‘anything that puts 
people’s bills up is a big issue. And anything involving intervening in people’s 
homes is a big issue. You’ve got them all. It’d be an absolute car crash’ (8). 
Some interviewees believed consumer issues associated with heat 
decarbonisation in general may be more solvable than generally 
believed and could be solved by a better functioning and larger market 
(particularly for heat pumps) (2) alongside better marketing (4). 
Consumer disruption per se was also not necessarily seen as a bad 
thing, e.g. mobile phones were actually massively disruptive but are 
viewed positively (4) although it should be noted that this is one specific 
example which varies significantly to the sorts of potential disruption 
associated with heat decarbonisation. It was suggested that disruption 
from heat decarbonisation could also be minimised e.g. if carried out 
during house upgrades (2, 3) and technologies could be made ‘sexy’ or 
‘exciting’ to drive uptake (3). The example of lithium batteries being 
installed in homes was given which are ‘perhaps, the most boring products 
in the world’ (4). However, lithium batteries do not appear particularly 
disruptive and are not specifically associated with heat. 
5.1.2. Electrification 
Specific disruptive issues associated with the option of heat electri-
fication were perceived by policy makers. 
Two interviewees perceived electrification as particularly problem-
atic from a householder perspective, linked to ideas in the previous 
section, highlighting the need to replace gas boilers with potentially 
large ground and air source heat pumps (1) and a need for bigger ra-
diators and a smart control system, a ‘completely different way of heating 
your home’ (3). 
The issue of the capacity of the electricity system not being able to 
meet the demand for potential heat electrification was raised by a 
number of interviewees (1, 5, 7, 9). Highlighting the association of 
disruption linked to rapid and large magnitude changes, a politician 
explained ‘the capacity of generation that you’re going to require would have 
to expanded by something like three or even more to cope with the six toll 
variation in daily demand. Which looks a bit improbable in terms of a policy 
ask for generation over the next 30 years’ (1). A civil servant agreed that 
variability and peakiness of heat demand could cause challenges for 
electrification (9). Another interviewee suggested that the goal of elec-
trifying road transport could increase the demand on the electricity 
system further compounding the heat issue (1). 
While recognising uncertainty, a civil servant believed the UK’s 
liberalised electricity market could deliver capacity and growth in heat 
pumps if correctly designed (10) going on to explain: 
‘The electricity market works and you have the heat pump products that 
are available. So you have people in place. It’s easier, I think, to think 
about the actors. Would you change everything for electrification of heat? 
I don’t know. I probably doubt it. Ultimately, it’s just more electrons going 
through the grid’. 
Interestingly, a consultant believed that policy makers generally feel 
more ‘comfortable’ with the idea of an all-electric future (8). However, it 
was suggested that if a national electrification programme happened, a 
national oversight body would be needed (3), implying significant 
change from business as usual. 
5.1.3. Hydrogen conversion as a means to reduce disruption? 
The majority of interviewees believed that if converting the gas grid 
to hydrogen appeared to be less disruptive than other heat decarbon-
isation pathways, this would appeal to policy makers. This was because 
it is perceived to have the potential to be delivered at ‘a system level, 
rather that the household level, instead of full conversion household by 
household’ (3) and from a consumer perspective it could therefore reduce 
disruption (4, 5, 8, 9, 10). 
However, hydrogen was perceived to have some potential but un-
certain disruptive impacts (4, 5, 6). These uncertainties are explored in 
section 5.2.2 and are associated with whether hydrogen would require 
the replacement of internal domestic gas pipework (8, 10), the need for 
new boilers and more specifically changes to ‘burners’10 (3, 9), how 
hydrogen is produced at scale (4) and the length of time needed for a 
hydrogen conversion programme (10). It should be noted again that 
many of these ‘in the home’ issues relate to the issues of consumer 
disruption considered in section 5.1.1. 
A government advisor explained frankly 
‘it may well be that it is a similar level of buggeration to have the hydrogen 
based solution but I don’t think that’s been tested and neither does that 
seem to matter at this stage writing the policy … I don’t think that matters, 
the story is compelling and that’s why policymakers are interested. And I 
haven’t at any great length spoken to the current energy minister about 
this but I know that she’s very drawn to hydrogen as a solution because of 
that story, this idea of not buggering about in the home’ (3). 
The fact that detail is not perceived to matter suggests in this instance 
policy maker perceptions may be based on un-evidenced judgements 
rather than technical knowledge. While it may be naïve to expect all 
perceptions to be based on objective evidence, this specific example of 
such a senior member of the Government, highlights the importance of 
perceptions. 
Overall, interviewees did not generally view hydrogen conversion or 
heat electrification as any more disruptive than the other. Four in-
terviewees did not believe it was possible to know whether full hydrogen 
or full electrification would be more disruptive, one interviewee 
believed both pathways were perceived to be as disruptive as each other, 
three interviewees perceived electrification to be more disruptive than 
hydrogen and one perceived electrification as less disruptive than 
hydrogen. The only interviewee who suggested that hydrogen was 
perceived as much less disruptive than electrification was associated 
with the gas industry and this may reflect that interviewees own beliefs 
or their corporate position. 
The uncertainty over potential disruption for each option was 
highlighted by one interviewee who explained: 
‘I can see both hydrogen and electrification being as bad as each other. I 
can see hydrogen in a world where it could be much better than the other. 
And I could see a world where, actually, hydrogen is worse than electri-
fication’ (8). 
10 The burner is the element of a gas boiler where burning takes place and 
burners are affected by variations in gas supply. 
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5.2. Uncertainty 
While uncertainty (not just over levels of disruption) emerged as a 
key theme from the analysis, this is perhaps unsurprising as existing 
government literature has highlighted the perceived challenges associ-
ated with heat decarbonisation and questions over technological path-
ways (BEIS, 2018c; HM Government, 2017). Based on interview data, 
the following section considers the key perceived uncertainties associ-
ated with heat decarbonisation. 
Interviews highlighted perceived uncertainty across a range of 
fundamental issues:  
� ‘in the assumptions under analysis’ used in models future energy 
pathways (10);  
� Associated with technologies and technological performance (2, 8, 
10);  
� Around how lifestyles and culture may change (2, 10);  
� On technology costs (7, 8, 9); 
� The potential geographical variance in optimal technology deploy-
ment (1, 5, 9). 
5.2.1. Trilemma 
The trilemma approach which considers, costs, security and sus-
tainability is a widely used normative approach to appraise energy 
systems and the interview approach explicitly explored how heat 
decarbonisation options we perceived alongside the trilemma and its 
associated elements. 
Overall, half of interviewees did not currently believe that the tri-
lemma was a suitable way to evaluate options for heat decarbonisation 
(2, 3, 6, 8, 9). This unsuitability was linked to general uncertainty over 
technology pathways as well as perceived uncertainty over costs across 
technologies (6, 9), uncertainty over potential for carbon reduction 
potential of technologies (6), a belief that energy security would never 
be compromised (3) and because the trilemma approach does not take 
the issue of disruption into account (9). 
Perceptions on costs varied across interviewees with costs:  
� Perceived to be higher for heat decarbonisation compared to doing 
nothing (4, 10);  
� Expected to be similar for either hydrogen or electrification (10);  
� Potentially cheaper for electrification compared to hydrogen 
(depending on technologies used) (4); 
� Potentially cheaper for hydrogen conversion compared to electrifi-
cation (5, 7, 9);  
� Totally unknowable (8) with one interviewee explain they had heard 
total heat decarbonisation costs ranging from £150 billion to £500 
billion (9). 
One interviewee highlighted specific significant uncertainties 
around costs for carbon capture and storage (CCS) and batteries (8). 
Another explained: 
‘The error bars around the costs and the levels of disruption for the 
different options are so great, that there’s no clear winner. No clear 
winner has emerged, until the error bars narrow and there’s daylight 
between the different options, and then you can say, “Right."’ (9). 
On energy security, interviewees highlighted the rapid increase in 
electricity generation capacity as a potential security issue for heat 
electrification (1, 10). On hydrogen, a civil servant explained ‘if you’re 
going to use a natural gas to produce it, [hydrogen] has big energy security 
implications. We might be using more natural gas than we do now and 
obviously we’re already a net importer, so that might increase unless we get a 
lot of indigenous shale, which is perhaps unlikely’ (10). 
A government advisor explained that, because of the absolute 
requirement for individuals to have warm homes, energy security of 
heat was not in general a good metric (3). Of the interviewees to make 
judgements:  
� One thought that both heat decarbonisation pathways had similar 
levels of security (5);  
� One thought electrification could be more secure (7); 
� Another suggested that if electrification was based around ‘indige-
nous renewables production, that’s quite secure’ (9). 
Perceptions of sustainability of heat decarbonisation pathways var-
ied with one interviewee saying it was impossible to judge (2), two in-
terviewees suggesting that electrification would be more sustainable as 
it may be able to achieve lower carbon levels (4,7), one suggesting both 
could be low carbon but not zero carbon (5) and one interviewee 
explaining that if hydrogen was produced from natural gas alongside 
carbon capture, for some that is: ‘not really playing the game. Storing the 
problem for future generations, as far as they’re concerned. So, yes, not very 
environmentally sustainable in their eyes’ (8). 
The perception of uncertainty and the expectation of disruption 
means that the widely used trilemma approach is not seen as suitable for 
considering heat decarbonisation options. This is particularly interesting 
because of the historic use of this measure for energy policy analysis. 
However, the value of the trilemma may increase if uncertainty around 
options can be reduced. 
5.2.2. Hydrogen’s uncertainties 
While heat electrification was seen as clearly disruptive and 
hydrogen perceived as potentially less disruptive, the technical issues of 
converting the gas grid to hydrogen were perceived to be deeply un-
certain. This is not to say there are not uncertainties associated with 
electrification, however, the uncertainties for hydrogen appear to be 
more significant in interviewee perceptions. 
Two interviewees suggested that reforming low carbon hydrogen 
from natural gas, while the key current proposed solution, would have 
issues delivering at the scale needed (1, 4) echoing the capacity concerns 
associated with electrification. Relying on CCS to be low carbon, which 
the reformation approach does, was also seen to be a key issue (3, 4, 9). 
The actual suitability of the gas grid to transport hydrogen was also seen 
to be uncertain (4). 
Issues were raised around the safety issues associated with produc-
ing, transporting and using hydrogen (1,4, 10) and the perceptions of the 
general public to these safety issues was also seen as important (1). 
At a household level, there was uncertainty over:  
� Whether or not people would need to be at home in order to let an 
engineer carry out a switch over (5);  
� Questions around the suitability of existing internal pipework for 
hydrogen (5,8, 10);  
� The need for and availability of hydrogen suitable gas boilers (1, 3, 5, 
8) or changes to the ‘burner’ (3);  
� The requirement for new hobs and ovens for cooking (3). 
One interviewee suggested that policy makers viewed hydrogen as 
simple: ‘partly because incumbents have an interest in saying it’ll all be fine. 
Or just need to go in and do a small flick of a switch and it’ll be fine. As far as 
I am aware, that doesn’t yet exist, as a technology’ (laughs) (8). This again 
highlights that judgements, perhaps not based on objective evidence, 
may be having an impact on the perceptions of hydrogen. If this is the 
case, further analysis into how these perceptions have come to be, 
particularly in light of how they issue is framed by incumbents, may be 
of value. An important question is, are incumbents, or other interests, 
shaping policy makers’ perceptions? 
Another interviewee explained that to manage the switch to 
hydrogen ‘I think you might need to create something bespoke to oversee the 
transition … ’ (3). A lack of both an existing low-carbon hydrogen 
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production market and suitable hydrogen products as well as consumer 
offerings was also perceived to be a particular issue for hydrogen (10), 
with electrification: ‘you have products, you have a market which works. 
Hydrogen, you don’t have any of that yet.’ (10). 
5.2.3. False dichotomy 
While most comments focused on hydrogen or electrification as a 
means to decarbonise heat, not all interviewees perceived the pathways 
as mutually exclusive. 
Half of interviewees mentioned the potential for hybrid heat decar-
bonisation pathways where gas and electricity are used together in 
buildings (1, 2, 3, 5, 10), which may be less disruptive (10). Hybrid heat 
pumps which combine a heat pump and a secondary heat source such as 
gas were perceived to have seen support from gas network owner Wales 
and West Utilities (5, 10) and the Committee on Climate Change (2, 3). 
As explained in section 2.1, hybrid heating systems may have energy 
system benefits; they can potentially reduce electricity system impacts of 
full electrification, while also potentially limiting the requirements for 
within household upgrades. 
As mentioned previously, uncertainty is also perceived around where 
may be the best place to use certain heat technologies with certain 
technologies suited to certain geographies (1, 5). 
There was a perception that the debate has recently moved from 
100% hydrogen towards hybridisation: ‘a year or so ago I’d have said 
definitely hydrogen is the dominant option now, when people are talking 
about it in that way, I think now we’re at a slightly different stage. We’ve 
moved into a more mixed space and potentially more sensible space.’ (10). 
5.3. Policy and political challenges 
The scale of the political challenge of heat decarbonisation led one 
interviewee to suggest: 
‘I think it’s [heat] the key test of the Climate Change Act … This is un-
likely to be a vote winner, huge cost, major intervention in people’s lives so 
this is always for the next term of office. So, I think the barrier to this is a 
political one rather than an analytical’ (3). 
Low political awareness of heat decarbonisation means political 
support for change is perceived to be limited (1, 7). The disruption to 
consumers and work inside homes is perceived as a particularly signif-
icant policy and political issue for heat (3, 5, 8) with a suggestion that 
‘all hell is going to break loose’ (8) if low carbon heating technology was 
mandated soon. A particular policy concern was the impact on consumer 
costs (1, 3, 7, 9); increasing costs and disrupting consumers was not seen 
as something that politicians could support (7). 
Uncertainty was also seen to be limiting policy making (1, 2, 5, 8, 9): 
‘various people are paralysed in the face of decisions they’re not sure about 
the efficacy of’ (1). UK heat policy discourse was perceived as being ‘in a 
pretty woeful state’ representing a ‘stand-off’ between industry and 
Government with one waiting for the other to act first (4). Another 
believed that the ‘big binary [between electrification and hydrogen] gets 
in the way of making sensible choices’ (2) and an industrial interviewee 
explained: ‘I still think we’re in discovery stage for heat. So, I think the 
pathways are still being developed in their [policy makers] eyes’ (5). 
It appears that the perceived binary and the associated uncertainty is 
limiting the ability to make rational policy decisions highlighting ideas 
of incomplete evidence and bounded rationality, however perhaps, a 
rational response to the current perceived uncertainty is to avoid policy 
decisions. 
Concerns were also perceived regarding the influence of external 
actors on heat policy with the cancellation of the 2016 ‘zero carbon 
homes’ (ZCH) policy (10) attributed to house builders (who admitted 
lobbying against the policy (House of Commons, 2019) and the popu-
larity of hydrogen among policy makers linked to influencing efforts of 
incumbents (2, 7, 9) (investigated previously by Lowes et al., 2018a). 
The Government’s reliance on external data and ideas for policy 
development, particularly by inexperienced and non-expert civil ser-
vants, was believed to cause the policy process to be affected by undue 
influence from existing incumbent interests. Government documents 
then reflect those who ‘shout the loudest’ and these views become insti-
tutionally engrained (2). This suggests those with capacity to lobby, may 
be successful at getting ideas onto the agenda. While it is clear that 
larger organisations may have greater capacity to lobby and engage in 
policy, an alternative view suggests that small and energetic entrepre-
neurial actors may also achieve significant policy success (Fitch-Roy 
et al., 2019; Mintrom, 2019). 
Further research, which is beyond this article, could investigate this 
issue for heat decarbonisation in further detail through a more forensic 
approach to policy analysis as has been used previously in the sector (e. 
g.Lowes et al., 2019). A more discursive approach which considers the 
changing use of ideas and language within policy networks could also 
have particular value for understanding the impact of ideas and how 
they become embedded (e.g Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016). 
Some interviewees also believed that limited deployment of heat 
pumps had affected perceptions of policy makers (4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
causing a policy ‘rethink’ (10) and a focus on hydrogen to decarbonise 
the gas grid. It should however be noted that it has been suggested that 
policy failures, rather than technology issues, have resulted in a lack of 
heat pump deployment (National Audit Office, 2018). 
5.3.1. Timescales and short term foci 
Despite the need for a transformation of the UK’s heat system within 
30 years, a number of interviewees thought that decisions on heat could 
wait until between 2020 and 2025 (3, 5, 7, 10); mass deployment of 
renewable heat was suggested to be needed from the 2030s (4). The UK 
Government’s climate change advisor suggests that a decision will be 
needed regarding the future of the gas grid in the mid 2020’s and a 
longer term milestone is for all heating replacement systems to be low- 
carbon after 2035 (Committee on Climate Change, 2019c) suggesting a 
2025 timescale may be suitable before major decisions are made. Flex-
ibility in the UK’s carbon budgets could also reduce the need for im-
mediate action for heat (2). 
However a civil servant suggested that the ‘next couple of years are 
critical for starting, for establishing the ideas of showstoppers here, the main 
showstoppers to different pathways, and starting that discussion around 
deliverability and the policy discussion’ (10). There was also a belief that 
the potential for hybrid pathways could complicate timescales by 
increasing uncertainty over the optimal pathway (3). 
Before a strategic decision on the gas grid was made, interviewees 
believed there were no-regret technologies which could be delivered 
today (1, 2, 7) including heat pumps (2), biomethane (1, 2), energy ef-
ficiency for existing buildings (4, 6) and low carbon new homes, 
described as a ‘no-brainer’ (6). A focus on homes not connected to the 
gas grid was also perceived as sensible (4). 
There was a perception that better data on information and heat 
decarbonisation could support policy makers (1, 5, 9) alongside better 
networking to bring heat interests together (2). Better data could lead to 
more rational and evidenced policy decisions. The potential adoption of 
a net zero goal (which has now happened (Parliament, 2019)) was 
something that could support and motivate policy makers to act on heat 
(2) alongside the development of low carbon heat customer propositions 
which could support policy makers with policy development (4). 
5.4. Methodological and theoretical considerations 
Overall, the methodological approach and our sample provided a 
wide range of view-points on policy maker’s perceptions and there 
didn’t appear to be a need for additional specific interviewees consider 
‘other’ perspectives. While further interviews with civil servants and 
politicians could have provided a broader perspective on views within 
government/parliament, only certain civil servants were willing to 
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speak, possibly reflecting time pressures and the belief that providing 
one interviewee would be satisfactory. With regards to politicians, the 
potential for further interviewees was limited by the number of Mem-
bers of Parliament with an interest in energy issues. 
A greater number of interviewees in general could have further 
strengthened our results and allowed analysis of whether certain per-
ceptions on technologies linked to certain types of interviewee. It is 
interesting for example that the only interviewee who suggested that 
policy makers perceived low-carbon gas as much less disruptive was 
from the gas industry. While analysis linking views on policy maker 
perceptions, to type of interviewee is beyond the scope of this research, 
this approach could provide interesting results for others interested in 
analysis of policy maker’s perceptions. 
The limited existing literature on policy maker perceptions suggests 
that in some cases, more information can support policy makers to make 
decisions (Corrigan and Watson, 2003; Morrison et al., 2015). Indeed, a 
lack of knowledge around future options appears to have led to uncer-
tainty in perceptions of policy makers working on heat which could be 
limiting decision making. While information may help policy makers, 
for heating it appears that the required knowledge, regarding optimal 
heat decarbonisation pathways is currently not available. This suggests 
that new knowledge may be needed. In section 6, we explain that rele-
vant trials and demonstrations of heat technologies may be able to 
reduce uncertainties for policy makers however, we recognise that it is 
difficult or perhaps impossible to guarantee certainty. 
5.4.1. Biases and heuristics: an area for future analysis? 
‘Heuristics’ and ‘biases’ are psychological tools which are used by 
individuals to make ‘fast and frugal’ decisions (Mousavi, 2018, p70) 
which require limited ‘computation’ (Vis, 2019). While these tools 
haven’t been the specific focus of this research, they are suggested to 
have particular value at times of uncertainty (Maitland and Sammartino, 
2015) and have specifically been suggested to be important at times of 
policy uncertainty in order to support decision making (Vis, 2019). With 
the policy uncertainty around heat decarbonisation, analysis of ‘biases’ 
and ‘heuristics’ associated with policy makers and the policy process 
could be a valuable area of future research. 
Lewis (2013) suggests some key ‘heuristics and biases’ (p5) relevant 
when thinking about policy change: 
� ‘The availability heuristic’ means salient and vivid events and ex-
periences are easy to retrieve;  
� ‘A representative heuristic’ magnifies the impact of rare but vivid 
events;  
� ‘Prospect theory’ (associated with ideas of ‘loss aversion’) means 
potential losses are perceived as more significant than equivalent 
gains;  
� ‘Framing effects’ suggests emotional or moral judgements may have 
an effect on well thought out preferences;  
� ‘Confirmation bias’ means material which corroborates what is 
already believed is given particular credibility;  
� ‘Optimism bias’ causes individuals to perceive previously made 
choices as working out well even if they are not; 
� ‘Status-quo bias’ means individuals prefer to stick with existing de-
cisions or familiar things. 
A number of issues associated with these heuristics emerged from 
this analysis of policy maker perceptions including:  
� A recognition of negative perceptions of heat decarbonisation 
particularly around consumer disruption which echoes ideas of 
prospect theory.  
� Where perceptions of technologies had been affected by framing 
effects such as lobbying around the issue of hydrogen and subsequent 
positive perceptions in spite of clear uncertainty.  
� Perceptions of technologies linked to a ‘status quo bias’ where both 
elements of hydrogen and electrification are valued because of the 
perceived potential continuation of existing systems. 
Subsequent detailed analysis of heuristics and biases associated with 
policy change may add value to the somewhat descriptive nature of 
much policy maker perceptions research. Further analysis could also 
provide insight into how UK heat policy maker’s perceptions have 
formed and the potential impact of heuristics and biases on policy 
change. 
6. Conclusions 
In providing a novel approach investigating a contemporary UK 
energy policy issue, this article set out to consider:  
1. How do policy makers perceive options for heat decarbonisation?  
2. Can these perceptions be linked to existing theory on the psychology 
of policy makers?  
3. Do the findings from this research have any implications for the UK 
and wider international heat decarbonisation policy? 
Section 5 explored how policy makers perceive heat decarbonisation 
in detail. Overall, policy makers view heat decarbonisation as funda-
mentally disruptive, particularly for consumers, with little ‘up-side’. 
Perceptions of disruption are compounded with perceptions of uncer-
tainty associated with potential heat decarbonisation technologies and 
their wider system impacts. So great is the expected disruption and 
uncertainty that the stalwart approach for assessing energy systems, the 
trilemma, is not currently seen as particularly useful by heat policy 
makers. 
While policy makers recognise uncertainty, what this uncertainty is, 
appears to be relatively well known. There is particular uncertainty over 
whether converting the UK’s gas system for heat to hydrogen at scale 
would be technically possible, given its novel approach and reliance on 
CCS (for the production of low carbon hydrogen) which is surprising 
considering the attention given to this approach by policy makers. 
This article has also linked perceptions of policy makers with the 
issues associated with the psychology of policy makers. The impacts of 
bounded rationality have been highlighted in the perceptions of un-
certainty associated with the electric versus hydrogen heat future. 
Apparently, partly as a result of uncertainty, policy decisions which may 
have clear benefits for decarbonisation, even in light of some uncer-
tainty, are not being made. Policy makers perceive themselves as 
bounded as a perception exists that a lack of evidence is limiting policy 
making, and more/better evidence could support better policy making. 
While bounded rationality emerged as an issue particularly linked to 
uncertainty, rather than bounded rationality leading to imperfect policy 
decisions, the level of uncertainty means that it appears difficult for 
policy makers to make decisions on heat decarbonisation. Despite the 
urgency of heat decarbonisation timescales, satisficing resulting from 
imperfect information appears to have led to an acceptance of uncer-
tainty as a reason to wait before decisions are made. The belief that 
greater certainty can be provided by new evidence echoes much of the 
literature considering policy makers’ perceptions considered in section 
3.4. It is however unlikely that simply having more evidence will drive 
heat decarbonisation because other issues, such as disruption to con-
sumers under any decarbonisation pathway, are at play. 
Overall, this study has provided novel analysis which contributes to 
the literatures considering the perceptions of policy makers and the 
psychology of policy makers. Future analysis associated with heat 
decarbonisation policy may also benefit from wider consideration of the 
heuristics and biases associated with policy maker’s perceptions. As well 
as providing interesting theoretical insight to build on the perceptions 
literature, the recognised importance of heuristic and biases at times of 
uncertainty, could provide significant practical value for UK policy 
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makers looking to decarbonise heat who are faced with significant 
uncertainty. 
Further investigation into how the perceptions of policy makers are 
shaped by various interest groups could also provide further valuable 
analysis on the role of power associated with socio-technical change. 
As explained in section 3.2, much of the existing literature consid-
ering policy maker perceptions has considered the healthcare sector. 
Healthcare research, for example around drug development, will use 
‘large n’ quantitative research and policy decisions may often (but not 
always) focus on specific clinical issues. Many energy policy and spe-
cifically, heat policy issues are considering long-term strategic, infra-
structure based socio-technical transitions with potentially varying 
geographical, building level and citizen impacts. Further research into 
policy maker perceptions, and the role and use of ‘evidence’ across 
different sectors may become a fruitful area of research, with potential 
to provide unique insights from different sectors which can support 
various policy processes. 
If policy makers perceive heat decarbonisation as fundamentally 
disruptive and uncertain, and the development of policy is delayed, 
there may be implications for whether the UK’s goal for decarbonised 
heating will be met. It will never be possible to eradicate uncertainty but 
it may be possible to reduce this uncertainty. There may also be ap-
proaches or technologies which can reduce the consumer disruption 
associated with heat disruption and again further research, analysis and 
collaboration may support this. In a market like the UK’s where the 
penetration of low carbon heating is so limited, focusing on deployment 
of low carbon heating in areas where costs are lowest such as in areas not 
connected to the gas grid, valuable learning may take place. Continuing 
the focus on international approaches to heating, as others have done 
(Hanna et al., 2016), may also provide examples of ways to reduce 
disruption and uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, the scale of the potential heat transformation and the 
asset lives of heating appliances and infrastructure mean that the diffi-
culties should not be under-estimated. It may be the case that uncer-
tainty associated with heat decarbonisation is not actually a high as is 
suggested and uncertainty is being used as a reason to delay action 
which is perceived to be deeply disruptive and politically unpopular. 
With just three decades to decarbonise heating in the UK, rapid policy 
development is needed and even if there is uncertainty, which there 
always will be, decisions will need to be made in the face of it. The 
following sub-section considers policy issues in more detail. 
6.1. Policy implications 
This section considers the third research question. 
Perhaps most significantly for UK heat decarbonisation efforts, these 
results highlight the perceived requirement for more evidence before UK 
policy makers feel comfortable making more interventionist decisions 
on heat. However, the key uncertainty highlighted by this research is 
regarding the future heat sources for buildings currently connected to 
the gas grid rather than heat decarbonisation more generally. The 
following suggestions are likely to have value for other countries with 
significant gas distribution infrastructure such as the Netherlands, Italy, 
the United States and Canada. 
We propose heat policy makers should focus on three goals: 
Reduce uncertainty: significant efforts should be made to reduce 
uncertainty through research and analysis and technological trials. In 
particular, technological trials associated with the performance of 
hydrogen in the existing gas system should be prioritised in order to 
understand the technical viability and costs of this option. While rela-
tively small trials are underway and supported by UK Government 
funding,11 a demonstration to combine all technological elements 
including low carbon hydrogen supply, conversion of an existing gas 
grid area and deployment of appliances would provide valuable learning 
and possibly reduce uncertainties. This trial could build on previous 
studies led by gas distribution network companies (e.g. Northern Gas 
Networks et al., 2016). 
We also note that the current ‘Heat Electrification Demonstration 
Project’, which aims to install heat pumps across a range of property 
types, could reduce uncertainty around electrification options (HM 
Government, 2019). 
While natural policy-learning is likely to take place around current 
and future heat technology studies which can inform future policy 
(Dunlop, 2017), ensuring that trials and results are independently 
verified may be important for such a transformative and challenging 
policy issue. Government should therefore provide resources to ensure 
such verification and to ensure that the best available evidence is used as 
a basis for policy making. It should however be considered that further 
research could further highlight existing uncertainty further (Jensen and 
Wu, 2016) and it has been suggested that a decision on the future of the 
UK gas network is required by the mid-2020s (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2018). 
Focus on low regrets options initially: There are a range of very 
low regret heat policy options around deployment of energy efficiency, 
decarbonisation of off-gas-grid buildings and mandating low carbon 
heating for new buildings which are not affected by the uncertainty over 
the future of currently gas heated buildings (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019c). 
Energy system modelling, including that carried out for Committee 
on Climate Change has also repeatedly shown a requirement for an in-
crease in the use of heat networks (Committee on Climate Change, 
2019b) and indeed the UK Government’s own analysis has suggested a 
significant increase in the amount of heat provided to UK homes from 
heat networks by 2050 across all scenarios, including where hydrogen is 
prioritised (HM Government, 2017). Deployment of heat networks is 
therefore a low regret area which Government can continue to support 
through both existing projects around guidance (The Heat Networks 
Delivery Unit) and capital funding (Heat Networks Investment Project) 
(HM Government, 2020). 
Accept uncertainty: It will never be possible to remove uncertainty 
associated with the optimal low carbon heat solutions and, with short 
decarbonisation timescales, some uncertainty and therefore risk, will 
need to be accepted. A major uncertainty currently appears to be how 
many homes currently connected to the gas grid will need to use heat 
pumps in the future. In light of this specific uncertainty, policy makers 
could initially provide specific support to these households for example 
providing finance or policy support, such as grants, which create no 
additional costs or risks for consumers. This, and other policies which 
are associated with technological uncertainty can be modified as evi-
dence becomes clearer. 
There are existing tools which UK Government policy makers have to 
deal with uncertain futures, one example being ‘The Futures Toolkit’ 
which includes various approaches to attempt to understand the future 
and to test potential policy approaches (Government Office for Science, 
2007). ‘Adaptive governance’ processes involving ongoing iteration and 
assessment have been proposed as one option to deal with policy un-
certainty (Jensen and Wu, 2016; Root et al., 2015; Walker and Marchau, 
2003) and are seen to have particular value for climate change mitiga-
tion policy (Roelich and Giesekam, 2019). Further research investi-
gating a potential role for adaptive governance specifically associated 
with heat decarbonisation could add value. 
While these proposed steps may support policy makers, and uncer-
tainty may be reducible or manageable, significant disruption, particu-
larly for consumers, appears likely whatever approach to 
decarbonisation is taken. Politicians (who will need to deliver heat 
decarbonisation policy) who are seeking re-election appear unlikely to 
be supportive of policies which disrupt consumers and increase energy 
costs, which heat decarbonisation may do. 
11 E.g. ‘Hy4Heat’ is investigating within building safety and appliance testing 
(Hy4Heat, 2020). 
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Further still, the need for rapid decarbonisation implies that policy 
must rapidly support the deployment of known technologies which can 
support heat decarbonisation such as heat pumps, energy efficiency and 
the deployment of heat networks. Despite the cost-effectiveness and 
decarbonisation potential of some of these technologies, particularly 
energy efficiency technology, recent deployment has been and remains 
limited (Committee on Climate Change, 2019c) suggesting that even 
economically ‘rational’ policies are not being progressed. 
If rational policy cannot be delivered then this suggests that more 
disruptive policy stands little chance of being introduced. The UK 
Government’s proposed policy of banning new homes from using fossil 
fuel heating systems from 2025 (HM Treasury, 2019) is a sensible initial 
regulatory step12 but this could be introduced sooner and further much 
more significant interventions will be required. 
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Annex 1. Interview outline 
All interviews were carried out by the lead author with around half in 
person and half over the phone. This structure of interviews was based 
around the following topics but further discussion, some organic and 
some based around probing by the interviewer, took place.  
1. The project was introduced explaining that the focus was on the 
views of UK policy makers on heat decarbonisation pathways or 
policy in the context of three potential key heat decarbonisation 
technology options, low-carbon gas, electrifications and hybrid 
approaches. To start discussions, interviewees were asked to 
explain how they viewed current debates around heat decar-
bonisation technology and policy.  
2. The second element asked interviewees to consider the idea of the 
‘trilemma’ and to consider how different heat decarbonisation 
technology options could be associated with the trilemma issues 
of cost, environmental sustainability and energy security.  
3. The element of interviews specifically considered the issue of the 
impacts of heat decarbonisation on ‘consumers’ and industry to 
investigate whether certain approaches were perceived to reduce 
impact and disruption.  
4. Interviewees were asked to consider if certain technology options 
appeared more deliverable for policy makers and if so why.  
5. This question focused on the potential issues for policy makers 
associated with converting the UK’s gas grid to run on low carbon 
gas.  
6. This question focused on the potential issues for policy makers 
associated with converting much heat demand to electricity.  
7. Interviewees were then asked to consider how the issues 
considered in questions 5 and 6 compare.  
8. Interviewees were then asked whether the deployment of certain 
technologies could be achieved with existing actors or whether 
the role of government and industry would need to change.  
9. The question asked whether policy makers currently felt able to 
make major decisions on heat decarbonisation and if not, how 
these decisions could be supported.  
10. This question asked whether recent lack of deployment of low 
carbon technologies had affected policy making. 
11. Interviewees were asked to consider timescales for heat decar-
bonisation and whether decarbonisation by 2050 was possible. 
12. The final question asked whether general concerns over disrup-
tion could limit policy making for heat decarbonisation.  
13. Finally, interviewees were given the opportunity to raise any 
other issues. 
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